David Enoch

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Levi SpectreThe Open University of IsraelEmail verificata su openu.ac.il
Talia FisherSchool of Law Tel Aviv UniversityEmail verificata su post.tau.ac.il
Joshua SchechterProfessor of Philosophy, Brown UniversityEmail verificata su brown.edu
Andrei Marmorcornell universityEmail verificata su cornell.edu
Ron AboodiThe University of Toronto, Tel Aviv universityEmail verificata su mail.utoronto.ca
Ofer MalcaiDoctor of Law, Hebrew UniversityEmail verificata su mail.huji.ac.il
Michal Shur-OfryAssociate Professor, Hebrew University of JerusalemEmail verificata su mail.huji.ac.il
Netta Barak-CorrenProfessor of Law, Hebrew University of JerusalemEmail verificata su mail.huji.ac.il
Itamar Weinshtock SaadonRutgers UniversityEmail verificata su rutgers.edu
Alon HarelEmail verificata su mail.huji.ac.il
Eliav LieblichProfessor of Law, Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv UniversityEmail verificata su tauex.tau.ac.il

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David Enoch

Professor of the Philosophy of Law, Oxford; Professor of Law and Philosophy, The Hebrew University

Email verificata su mail.huji.ac.il - Home page

Philosophy and Law


Titolo Ordina per citazioni Ordina per anno Ordina per titolo	Citata da Citata da	Anno
Taking morality seriously: A defense of robust realism D Enoch Oxford University Press, USA, 2011	1195	2011
Agency, shmagency: Why normativity won't come from what is constitutive of action D Enoch The Philosophical Review 115 (2), 169-198, 2006	513	2006
The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it, and how to cope with it D Enoch Philosophical studies 148, 413-438, 2010	293	2010
Not just a truthometer: Taking oneself seriously (but not too seriously) in cases of peer disagreement D Enoch Mind 119 (476), 953-997, 2010	226	2010
Statistical evidence, sensitivity, and the legal value of knowledge D Enoch, L Spectre, T Fisher Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (3), 197-224, 2012	218	2012
Against public reason D Enoch Oxford studies in political philosophy 1 (20), 112-142, 2015	176	2015
The case against moral luck D Enoch, A Marmor Law & Phil. 26, 405, 2007	167	2007
Why idealize? D Enoch Ethics 115 (4), 759-787, 2005	157	2005
Reason-giving and the law D Enoch Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law 1, 1-38, 2011	150	2011
A defense of moral deference D Enoch The Journal of Philosophy 111 (5), 229-258, 2014	149	2014
Shmagency revisited D Enoch New waves in metaethics, 208-233, 2011	149	2011
How is moral disagreement a problem for realism? D Enoch The Journal of Ethics 13, 15-50, 2009	146	2009
How are basic belief‐forming methods justified? D Enoch, J Schechter Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3), 547-579, 2008	133	2008
Authority and Reason‐Giving¹ D Enoch Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2), 296-332, 2014	129	2014
The disorder of public reason D Enoch Ethics 124 (1), 141-176, 2013	117	2013
An outline of an argument for robust metanormative realism D Enoch Oxford studies in metaethics 2 (2007), 21-50, 2007	104	2007
Sense and sensitivity: Epistemic and instrumental approaches to statistical evidence D Enoch, T Fisher Stan. L. Rev. 67, 557, 2015	101	2015
Giving practical reasons D Enoch The Philosopher's Imprint 11 (4), 2011	94	2011
Can there be a global, interesting, coherent constructivism about practical reason? D Enoch Philosophical Explorations 12 (3), 319-339, 2009	92	2009
Hypothetical Consent and the Value (s) of Autonomy D Enoch Ethics 128 (1), 6-36, 2017	89	2017

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