Follow
S. Matthew Weinberg
S. Matthew Weinberg
Assistant Professor, Princeton University
Verified email at princeton.edu - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward
M Carlsten, H Kalodner, SM Weinberg, A Narayanan
Proceedings of the 2016 acm sigsac conference on computer and communications …, 2016
3742016
Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design
R Kleinberg, SM Weinberg
Games and Economic Behavior 113, 97-115, 2019
284*2019
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer
M Babaioff, N Immorlica, B Lucier, SM Weinberg
Journal of the ACM (JACM) 67 (4), 1-40, 2020
2252020
Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts
H Kalodner, S Goldfeder, X Chen, SM Weinberg, EW Felten
27th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 18), 1353-1370, 2018
2252018
Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 130-139, 2012
2042012
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing …, 2012
1752012
Pricing lotteries
P Briest, S Chawla, R Kleinberg, SM Weinberg
Journal of Economic Theory 156, 144-174, 2015
143*2015
A duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design
Y Cai, NR Devanur, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2016
1282016
Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information
PD Azar, R Kleinberg, SM Weinberg
Games and Economic Behavior 118, 511-532, 2019
121*2019
Simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity
A Rubinstein, SM Weinberg
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 6 (3-4), 1-25, 2018
1212018
Bitcoin: A natural oligopoly
N Arnosti, SM Weinberg
Management Science 68 (7), 4755-4771, 2022
1052022
Understanding incentives: Mechanism design becomes algorithm design
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 618-627, 2013
1012013
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design
C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 370-387, 2012
94*2012
Formal barriers to longest-chain proof-of-stake protocols
J Brown-Cohen, A Narayanan, A Psomas, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 459-473, 2019
922019
Reducing revenue to welfare maximization: Approximation algorithms and other generalizations
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2013
742013
Optimal and efficient parametric auctions
P Azar, S Micali, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete …, 2013
672013
Parallel algorithms for select and partition with noisy comparisons
M Braverman, J Mao, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2016
572016
The sample complexity of up-to-ε multi-dimensional revenue maximization
YA Gonczarowski, SM Weinberg
Journal of the ACM (JACM) 68 (3), 1-28, 2021
512021
Computing exact minimum cuts without knowing the graph
A Rubinstein, T Schramm, SM Weinberg
arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.03165, 2017
512017
Optimal single-choice prophet inequalities from samples
A Rubinstein, JZ Wang, SM Weinberg
arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.07945, 2019
472019
The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later.
Articles 1–20