| Gathering information before signing a contract J Crémer, F Khalil The American Economic Review, 566-578, 1992 | 317 | 1992 |
| Auditing without commitment F Khalil The RAND Journal of Economics, 629-640, 1997 | 278 | 1997 |
| Contracts and productive information gathering J Crémer, F Khalil, JC Rochet Games and Economic Behavior 25 (2), 174-193, 1998 | 257 | 1998 |
| Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered J Crémer, F Khalil, JC Rochet Journal of Economic Theory 81 (1), 163-200, 1998 | 238 | 1998 |
| Collusive auditors F Khalil, J Lawarree The American Economic Review 85 (2), 442-446, 1995 | 115 | 1995 |
| INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT* F Khalil, J Lawarree The Journal of Industrial Economics 54 (2), 269-291, 2006 | 100 | 2006 |
| Input versus output monitoring: who is the residual claimant? F Khalil, J Lawarree Journal of Economic Theory 66 (1), 139-157, 1995 | 90 | 1995 |
| Loan size as a commitment device F Khalil, BM Parigi International Economic Review, 135-150, 1998 | 87 | 1998 |
| Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils F Khalil, J Lawarrée, S Yun The Rand journal of economics 41 (1), 179-198, 2010 | 85 | 2010 |
| Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting F Khalil, D Martimort, B Parigi Journal of Economic Theory 135 (1), 35-67, 2007 | 72 | 2007 |
| Gathering information before the contract is offered: The case with two states of nature J Crémer, F Khalil European Economic Review 38 (3-4), 675-682, 1994 | 66 | 1994 |
| Optimal task design: To integrate or separate planning and implementation? F Khalil, D Kim, D Shin Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 15 (2), 457-478, 2006 | 48 | 2006 |
| Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring F Khalil, J Lawarree Journal of Public Economics 82 (3), 327-347, 2001 | 40 | 2001 |
| Third party purchasing of health services: patient choice and agency M Chalkley, F Khalil Journal of Health Economics 24 (6), 1132-1153, 2005 | 37 | 2005 |
| Contracts offered by bureaucrats F Khalil, D Kim, J Lawarrée The RAND Journal of Economics 44 (4), 686-711, 2013 | 14 | 2013 |
| On commitment and collusion in auditing F Khalil, J Lawarree Working Papers, 2000 | 14 | 2000 |
| The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: evidence from a longitudinal household survey AKM Hussain, N Nargis, SM Ashiquzzaman, F Khalil GLO Discussion Paper, 2017 | 12 | 2017 |
| Service-level selection: strategic risk selection in Medicare Advantage in response to risk adjustment S Park, A Basu, N Coe, F Khalil National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017 | 11 | 2017 |
| Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information F Khalil, J Lawarree, TJ Scott The RAND Journal of Economics 46 (4), 872-890, 2015 | 11 | 2015 |
| Use it or lose it F Khalil, D Kim, J Lawarree Journal of Public Economic Theory 21 (6), 991-1016, 2019 | 9 | 2019 |
Jacques LawarreeProfessor of Economics, University of WashingtonEmail verificata su uw.edu
