Takuo Sugaya
Takuo Sugaya
Stanford GSB
Email verificata su stanford.edu - Home page
Titolo
Citata da
Citata da
Anno
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
J Hrner, T Sugaya, S Takahashi, N Vieille
Econometrica 79 (4), 1277-1318, 2011
1252011
The Folk theorem in repeated games with private monitoring
T Sugaya
Princeton University, 2012
782012
Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games
R Calcagno, Y Kamada, S Lovo, T Sugaya
Theoretical Economics 9 (2), 409-434, 2014
50*2014
Measuring the incentive to collude: The vitamin cartels, 1990-1999
M Igami, T Sugaya
Available at SSRN 2889837, 2021
28*2021
Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
T Sugaya, A Wolitzky
Theoretical Economics 12 (2), 691-729, 2017
25*2017
Maintaining privacy in cartels
T Sugaya, A Wolitzky
Journal of Political Economy 126 (6), 2569-2607, 2018
212018
The revelation principle in multistage games
T Sugaya, A Wolitzky
The Review of Economic Studies 88 (3), 1503-1540, 2021
192021
Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring
T Sugaya, S Takahashi
Journal of Economic Theory 148 (5), 1891-1928, 2013
192013
Optimal timing of policy announcements in dynamic election campaigns
Y Kamada, T Sugaya
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 135 (3), 1725-1797, 2020
14*2020
Belief-free review-strategy equilibrium without conditional independence
T Sugaya
Unpublished paper, Stanford Graduate School of Business.[1180], 2012
132012
Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting
T Sugaya
Theoretical Economics 10 (3), 691-717, 2015
112015
Characterizing the limit set of PPE payoffs with unequal discounting
T Sugaya
Princeton University, 2010
112010
Common learning and cooperation in repeated games
T Sugaya, Y Yamamoto
Theoretical Economics 15 (3), 1175-1219, 2020
9*2020
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Anonymous Random Matching
J Deb, T Sugaya, A Wolitzky
Econometrica 88 (3), 917-964, 2020
92020
Folk Theorem in a Prisoners’ Dilemma without Conditional Independence
T Sugaya
mimeo, 2010
62010
Electoral Campaigns as Dynamic Contests
A Acharya, E Grillo, T Sugaya, E Turkel
52021
Wait-and-see or step in? dynamics of interventions
D Foarta, T Sugaya
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13 (1), 399-425, 2021
5*2021
Communication and community enforcement
T Sugaya, A Wolitzky
Working Paper, 2020
42020
Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games
T Sugaya, A Wolitzky
Journal of Economic Theory 175, 58-87, 2018
42018
A Few Bad Apples Spoil the Barrel: An Anti-Folk Theorem for Anonymous Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
T Sugaya, A Wolitzky
American Economic Review 110 (12), 3817-35, 2020
12020
Il sistema al momento non pu eseguire l'operazione. Riprova pi tardi.
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