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Alex Wiegmann
Alex Wiegmann
PostDoc, Ruhr University Bochum, Emmy Noether Research Group "Extra", Institute of Philosophy II
Email verificata su ruhr-uni-bochum.de
Titolo
Citata da
Citata da
Anno
Putting the trolley in order: Experimental philosophy and the loop case
SM Liao, A Wiegmann, J Alexander, G Vong
Philosophical Psychology 25 (5), 661-671, 2012
1542012
19 moral judgment
MR Waldmann, J Nagel, A Wiegmann
The Oxford handbook of thinking and reasoning, 364, 2012
1402012
Order effects in moral judgment
A Wiegmann, Y Okan, J Nagel
Philosophical Psychology 25 (6), 813-836, 2012
1352012
Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge
J Horvath, A Wiegmann
Philosophical Studies 173, 2701-2726, 2016
792016
Transfer effects between moral dilemmas: A causal model theory
A Wiegmann, MR Waldmann
Cognition 131 (1), 28-43, 2014
722014
Lying despite telling the truth
A Wiegmann, J Samland, M Waldmann
Cognition, 2016
662016
Explaining moral behavior
M Osman, A Wiegmann
Experimental Psychology, 2017
532017
Is lying bound to commitment? Empirically investigating deceptive presuppositions, implicatures, and actions
LM Reins, A Wiegmann
Cognitive Science 45 (2), e12936, 2021
492021
No need for an intention to deceive? Challenging the traditional definition of lying
R Rutschmann, A Wiegmann
Philosophical Psychology 30 (4), 438-457, 2017
482017
Intuitive expertise in moral judgments
J Horvath, A Wiegmann
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2), 342-359, 2022
422022
Intuitive expertise and irrelevant options
A Wiegmann, J Horvath, K Meyer
Oxford studies in experimental philosophy 3 (3), 275, 2020
422020
The folk concept of lying
A Wiegmann, J Meibauer
Philosophy compass 14 (8), e12620, 2019
382019
Predicting responsibility judgments from dispositional inferences and causal attributions
AF Langenhoff, A Wiegmann, JY Halpern, JB Tenenbaum, T Gerstenberg
Cognitive Psychology 129, 101412, 2021
332021
How the truth can make a great lie: An empirical investigation of the folk concept of lying by falsely implicating.
A Wiegmann, P Willemsen, A Wiegmann
CogSci, 2017
282017
Lying, deceptive implicatures, and commitment
A Wiegmann, P Willemsen, J Meibauer
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8, 2022
272022
A double causal contrast theory of moral intuitions in trolley dilemmas
MR Waldmann, A Wiegmann
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 32 (32), 2010
262010
Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion
N Marsili, A Wiegmann
Cognition 212, 104657, 2021
242021
Can a question be a lie? An empirical investigation
E Viebahn, A Wiegmann, N Engelmann, P Willemsen
OSF Preprints, Epub ahead of print, 2020
242020
Empirically investigating the concept of lying
A Wiegmann, R Rutschmann, P Willemsen
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34, 591-609, 2017
142017
Causal models mediate moral inferences
MR Waldmann, A Wiegmann, J Nagel
Moral inferences, 45-63, 2017
142017
Il sistema al momento non pu eseguire l'operazione. Riprova pi tardi.
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